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Every spring, as large American companies prepare for their annual share- 
holder meeting,  executive compensation replaces income-tax  returns  as the 
topic of conversation around the lunch table and in the business press. The 
regularity of the phenomenon is related to the annual disclosure, in the proxy 
statements that accompany the annual reports usually published in March and 
April, of the compensation package earned by the five highest-paid employees 
of  U.S. corporations. Because these reports must show the cash value of  the 
capital gain associated with the exercise of stock options, they invariably con- 
tain some extremely large numbers. Furthermore, because the gains associated 
with the stock options have often accrued during the five to ten years that pre- 
ceded the announcements, every year ushers in one or many cases of a chief 
executive officer (CEO) who has an exceptionally large income in a year in 
which the company has done poorly. In a book that touched off  a firestorm 
around the issue of U.S. executive pay, Graef Crystal (1991, 1993) argued that 
the typical American chief executive was grossly overpaid and, worse, got there 
by the use of complicated long-term incentive compensation, including many 
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forms of stock options, that shareholders could not properly evaluate.’ A cen- 
tral thesis of Crystal’s book and the recent congressional  and regulatory at- 
tempts to limit executive compensation is that American executives receive 
compensation that is far greater than that received by executives in comparable 
positions around the world. 
Several authors, most notably Jensen and Murphy (1990a, 1990b), have ar- 
gued that the debate over the level of CEO compensation is misguided because 
the form of the payment, specifically the sensitivity of total compensation to 
the performance of the firm, is more important than the level of pay. Jensen 
and Murphy show that U.S. CEO pay is not very sensitive to performance, 
although they note that the portion of pay  delivered as restricted  stock and 
stock options creates a portfolio whose increased value to the CEO is clearly 
related to the price performance of the firm’s stock. In their extensive review 
of the pay-for-performance  literature, Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987) con- 
cluded that very few studies, including studies of CEO compensation, had es- 
tablished a clear statistical link between the structure of compensation and the 
performance of  the firm.2 While we agree that understanding the relation be- 
tween compensation system design  and firm performance is central  to the 
study of CEO compensation, we also believe that a careful multinational com- 
parison of the level and structure of executive pay and its evolution over time 
can inform the debate concerning the relative pay of American CEOs. Crystal’s 
book  does not  contain  detailed statistical  comparisons. To  the best  of  our 
knowledge, the only detailed statistical studies comparing executive compen- 
sation across many countries are those conducted by the large private compen- 
sation consulting firms, specifically the Hay Group, Hewitt Associates, Mercer 
International, Towers Pemn, and the Wyatt Company. These are our primary 
sources, and, except for Hewitt Associates,  we have used data from each of 
these sources. Although we make a variety of statistical adjustments, as do the 
sources before they publish their results, it is clear that American CEOs do 
earn more than CEOs of comparably sized companies in other countries. It is 
also clear that the structure of the American CEO’s compensation is quite dif- 
ferent, being composed of a much larger long-term component. Other Ameri- 
can executives, however, do not earn more than comparable executives in com- 
parably sized companies around the world. 
A careful international comparison of executive compensation and its rela- 
1. In Search of Excess was originally published in  1991. The paperback edition, published in 
1993, contains additional chapters that discuss the critiques of the hardback edition. Crystal was a 
professional executive compensation consultant before he retired to join the faculty of the Univer- 
sity of California, Berkeley, business school as an adjunct professor. 
2. Since their review was published, studies by Abowd (1990), Gerhart and Milkovich (1990). 
and Leonard (1990) and an additional review by Rosen (1990)  have appeared.  These newer studies 
estimated both an  equation linhng executive pay to firm performance and a second equation link- 
ing firm performance to the structure of executive pay. Although the results are mixed, these at- 
tempts to address both parts of the research question have focused scientific studies on the problem 
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tion to the compensation of ordinary employees could provide important evi- 
dence on the intercountry variation in CEO, high-level manager, and regular 
employee compensation. The quality of  the conclusions drawn from such a 
comparison rests critically on the comprehensiveness of the compensation in- 
formation and the thoroughness of  the distinction maintained between  em- 
ployer cost and employee value. Comprehensive data are necessary because 
(1) total compensation costs include all cash disbursements to employees, vol- 
untarily provided benefits, publicly mandated benefits, perquisites, and long- 
term compensation (multiyear bonus plans and stock-based compensation), (2) 
in different countries different parts of this compensation package are regulated 
with regard to funding or benefit formulas, and (3) there is substantial interna- 
tional variation in prices so that components delivered in kind in some coun- 
tries can have a very different value than if they were delivered in kind else- 
where.  Distinguishing  between  employer  cost  and  employee  benefit  is 
necessary because (1) public funding of  certain parts of  the compensation 
package creates an explicit tax-and-transfer component to the mandatory bene- 
fits that is quite heterogeneous across countries and (2) many long-term com- 
pensation plans are worth less to the employee who receives them than they 
cost the employer to pr~vide.~ 
In section 2.1 of this paper, we use public data from four different consulting 
firms and from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to illustrate the real level 
and evolution of employer total Compensation costs for CEOs, top human re- 
source  directors  (HRDs),  and  nonsupervisory  manufacturing  employees 
(called operatives  below)  for  twelve  OECD countries  (Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States) over the eight-year period from 
1984 to 1992. Our findings are (1) that U.S. CEOs rank first in total real com- 
pensation cost all through the period, (2) that U.S. HRDs fall in rank from first 
to tenth between  1984 and 1992, and (3) that U.S. manufacturing operatives 
not only fall from first to tenth in rank but are the only employees in the survey 
to decline in total real compensation cost, stated in U.S. dollars. In section 
2.2, we use published data from the OECD, national statistical agencies, and 
multinational accounting and consulting firms to construct a measure of after- 
tax constant purchasing power income that includes the value of privately con- 
sumed services supplied through the public sector. We  call this measure the 
private replacement value of the compensation package. Unlike real total com- 
pensation costs, which reflect employer costs and vary as a function of both 
the compensation costs and exchange rates, our constant purchasing power 
replacement values reflect variation in consumer indirect utility. The two com- 
pensation measures, therefore, respond differently to the integration of  world 
3. We refer here to the riskiness of  long-term compensation packages, which cannot be diversi- 
fied like the other parts of executive wealth. Thus, we presume that either a total tax  advantage 
(to the employer and employee jointly) or a productivity gain from the incentive nature of such 
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markets. Increased integration of world product and capital markets, through 
factor price equalization, should tend to equalize real total compensation costs 
across countries for similar employees. On the other hand, increased integra- 
tion of labor markets, through international migration, is required to equalize 
purchasing  power parity adjusted replacement  values.  Section 2.3  examines 
the trends in both of our compensation measures and in the intercountry varia- 
tion in these measures. We show that there has been a strong tendency toward 
equalization of the real total compensation costs but that no such tendency is 
evident for the replacement values. 
In section 2.4, we examine some of the tax and institutional differences that 
may contribute to the American CEO’s high total cost. We show that there are 
enormous differences in marginal tax rates, particularly marginal payroll  tax 
rates, among our sample countries between high-level managers and manufac- 
turing operatives. These high marginal tax rates have a depressing effect on 
CEO total compensation costs and replacement values  but not on the costs 
or private replacement  values of  other high-level managers or manufacturing 
employees. In contrast, the ratio of either CEO or HRD compensation (or re- 
placement value) to the comparable measure for manufacturing employees is 
very  sensitive to differences in the marginal tax rates, indicating that the fi- 
nancing of certain programs through the public sector in some countries and 
through the private sector in others has a very important distorting effect on 
the wage structure, particularly at the high end. In this section, we also show 
that American  managerial  pay  is more sensitive to the size of the company 
managed than is managerial pay in any of the European countries in our sample 
(comparable data for Canada and Japan were not available). The tax rate differ- 
ences and the differential sensitivity of pay to the size of the firm are two im- 
portant factors in explaining the high pay of American CEOs. Unfortunately, 
we cannot find an explanation for the big differences in long-term pay between 
American and other CEOs. We show some evidence that the incidence of  stock 
option compensation is increasing  in several of our European countries and 
that estimates of zero incidence rates for such compensation are probably not 
correct.  We  also show that there  are no longer  serious  legal restrictions  to 
stock-based compensation in any of our sample countries and that in some of 
those countries such compensation enjoys a tax advantage. We cannot explain 
why only U.S. CEOs seem to have received such large long-term compensa- 
tion  plans,  and we  speculate that a more integrated  world  labor market  for 
executives, coupled with the absence of currency and stock ownership regula- 
tion, may foster an increase in the stock-based long-term component of  non- 
U.S. executives’ compensation. 
2.1  Real Total Compensation Costs 
Real total compensation cost is the total cost to the firm  associated  with 
maintaining an employee, stated in 1990 U.S. dollars. Total compensation con- 
sists of the sum of base salary; annual bonus monetary compensation; all bene- 71  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
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Fig. 2.1  Real total compensation of CEOs, by components, 1984-92 
fits, payments in kind, and perquisites; and all long-term monetary compen- 
sation.  Base  salary  (or  base  pay  for  manufacturing workers)  is  all  cash 
compensation set in advance and payable throughout the year. The annual mon- 
etary bonus is all additional cash compensation based on annual performance 
evaluations. Benefits, payments in kind, and perquisites consist of  all costs 
associated with providing a service or retirement income to an employee. We 
distinguish between voluntary benefits, which are provided by an employer but 
not required by law, and publicly mandated benefits, which are provided either 
by the employer or by the government and are financed by a tax on employment 
such as a payroll tax. The cost of voluntary benefits is the employer’s expense 
in providing the benefit. The cost of mandatory benefits is the sum of the em- 
ployer expense in providing the benefit and the mandatory tax payments. The 
cost of long-term compensation is the annuity equivalent of the present value 
of awards that accrue over a period exceeding one year.4 Forms of  long-term 
compensation include stock-based compensation, such as stock option plans, 
and multiyear bonus plans. 
Figure 2.1 shows the real total compensation cost of the CEO in three com- 
ponents-base  salary plus annual bonus, all benefits and perquisites, and long- 
4.  All long-term compensation comes from the Towers Pemn surveys cited in the data appendix. 
Towers Pemn estimates the present value of long-term compensation on the date of award using 
a variety of economic models for the cash flows, including option pricing formulas and pro forma 
business simulation. The annuity equivalent is calculated using the usual interval between awards 
so that, if a company awards stock options, e.g., every three years, the present value of  any given 
option award is converted to a three-year annuity equivalent. 72  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
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Fig. 2.2  Real total Compensation of HRDs, by components, 1984-92 
term  compensation-for  the three years  1984, 1988, and  1992 and for all 
twelve countrie~.~  Compensation is stated in thousands of  1990 U.S. dollars 
using annual average exchange rates and the U.S. consumer price index. Across 
countries, an increasing trend in the level of total compensation cost for CEOs 
is evident. The trend results from general growth in all three compensation 
components. The total compensation cost of  U.S. CEOs is far higher than that 
of  foreign CEOs in each of  the three years, in large part because of  much 
higher amounts of  long-term compensation, but also because US. CEOs re- 
ceive the highest base salaries and annual bonus payments. We  note that U.S. 
CEOs maintain their absolute edge over foreign CEOs in real total compensa- 
tion cost despite the weakening of  the dollar between  1984 and  1992. The 
weakening of  the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies causes the compensation 
costs of other countries to rise when expressed in terms of U.S. dollars.6 
Figure 2.2 shows the real total compensation cost of the top human resource 
5. In this section and the next, we present figures comparing our various compensation measures 
for the years 1984 (the earliest year available), 1988 (the sample midpoint), and 1992 (the latest 
year available) in all twelve of our countries. The data selected for the figures is a subset of the 
data used in the statistical analyses of sec. 2.3 below. We tried to minimize problems of compara- 
bility by  selecting two managerial occupations  (CEO and HRD) for which we  had  reasonably 
complete data from comparable sources. Thus, the compensation data shown in the figures have 
not been statistically adjusted to account for differences in sources or average firm size. 
6.  Although this remark is equally applicable to the real total compensation costs in fig. 2.1, fig. 
2.2 below (for HRDs), and fig. 2.3 below (for manufacturing operatives), the real exchange rate 
effects in figs. 2.2 and 2.3 are much more apparent. Exchange rates provide the correct notion of 
employer cost; nevertheless, the data appendix provides in figs. 2A. 1.2A.2, and 2A.3 a comparison 
of total compensation costs adjusted using OECD annual average purchasing power parity rates. 73  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
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Fig. 2.3  Real total compensation of manufacturing operatives, by components, 
1984-92 
directors divided into the same three components as for the CEOs. Compensa- 
tion is again expressed in thousands of  1990 U.S. dollars at annual average 
exchange rates. The total compensation cost is rising markedly for HRDs be- 
tween  1984 and  1992 in each country. In contrast to the experience of U.S. 
CEOs, however, U.S. HRDs fell, relative to the HRDs of the other countries, 
in total compensation cost from first in  1984 to tenth by  1992. The rate of 
increase  in real  U.S.  dollar  total  compensation  cost  for  HRDs  was  much 
greater outside the United States.' 
Figure 2.3 shows the real total compensation cost of a production manufac- 
turing employee in two ways: total monetary compensation and all benefits and 
perquisites. Long-term compensation (except for pensions, which are included 
in benefits) is not an important part of manufacturing operative income. Com- 
pensation is stated, again, in thousands of  1990 U.S. dollars at annual average 
exchange rates. We note a strong upward trend in real total compensation costs 
for all but U.S. manufacturing operatives. A global real exchange rate adjust- 
ment of  the dollar  relative to  other currencies,  which occurred  during  the 
1980s, is the apparent cause of this trend. Although U.S. CEOs maintained 
their top ranking in compensation cost and U.S. HRDs fell in ranking but still 
experienced a real increase in compensation cost, the compensation cost of 
7.  We  show results only for the years 1984 and 1992 in fig. 2.2 because none of our data sources 
provided an estimate for a human resource director in 1988. 74  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
U.S.  manufacturing  operatives declined in rank  from first to tenth over the 
period and actually fell in real terms-the  only position and country combina- 
tion to fall in real total compensation cost in our entire sample. 
2.2  Private and Public Compensation at Constant Purchasing Power 
Private and public compensation at constant purchasing power, which we 
call the private replacement value of the compensation package, is the after- 
tax value to the employee of all privately and publicly provided compensation 
and benefits stated in  1990 OECD dollars using the OECD annual average 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. Thus, the private replacement 
value of the compensation package represents  the minimum expenditure at 
international  prices  required to replace the utility  level associated with the 
goods and services provided publicly and privately to an employee earning the 
typical compensation package in the country. 
We have paid careful attention to the value of benefits whether privately or 
publicly financed or provided because for international compensation compari- 
sons it is important to account for the significant differences among the coun- 
tries in the system of financing and delivering benefits. Some countries finance 
most of the benefit package through a maze of  payroll taxes, while consumers 
purchase the benefits themselves on the open market, and a semipublic agency 
then reimburses them. In other countries, the employer supplies the benefits as 
compensation in kind. In still other countries, consumers purchase and finance 
certain  services, considered employment benefits elsewhere, wholly outside 
the employment relation. In addition to benefits consumed currently by  the 
employees, the countries in our sample differ markedly in their systems for 
financing and  delivering retirement income.  In  several countries (Belgium, 
France, Italy, and Sweden, in particular), the public pension system represents 
both a significant employment cost and a direct public benefit even for CEOs. 
In order to compare the real after-tax and public benefit incomes of managers 
and workers in our twelve countries, therefore, we undertook a detailed analy- 
sis of the public benefit packages in each country. 
We define the private replacement value of a compensation package as the 
sum of base salary, annual bonus, voluntary benefits, publicly provided (man- 
datory) benefits, perquisites, long-term monetary compensation, and all public 
and private pension benefits less employee payroll and income taxes. We then 
divide this quantity, stated in local currency, by the product of the 1990-based 
OECD purchasing power parity exchange rates and the OECD index of con- 
sumer prices (1990 = 1.00). Thus, our measure controls for local differences 
in the prices of both publicly and privately supplied goods and services. 
We  valued base  salary, annual bonus, voluntary benefits, perquisites,  and 
long-term monetary compensation at employer cost. Therefore, the before-tax 
amount is identical to the amount that we used in the employer cost calcula- 
tions above. We computed the value of publicly provided (mandatory) benefits 75  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
by taking the sum of  a country’s expenditures on social protection programs, 
dividing this sum by the population of  the country, and multiplying by  four, 
thus assuming that the employee had a family of four. We valued public and 
private pension benefits by computing the projected retirement benefit on the 
basis of survey estimates of the percentage of final salary and bonus paid as a 
public or private pension at age sixty-five. We computed the present value of 
the pension at retirement assuming an expected remaining life of fifteen years 
(at 2 percent real interest). Finally, we converted this sum to an annuity equiva- 
lent over a forty-year working life (again at 2 percent real interest). To estimate 
employee payroll and income taxes, we used survey estimates and direct calcu- 
lations from simplified summaries of the relevant tax schedules. Income taxes 
assumed a family of four including two children. For source details, see the 
data appendix. 
For our measure of public benefits, we considered government spending on 
nine types of social protection, as classified by Eurostat-sickness,  invalidism, 
employment-related injury or disability, maternity, family assistant plans, job 
training and placement, unemployment benefits, housing subsidies, and mis- 
cellaneous social programs. For the countries of the European Community, the 
social protection expenditure data came directly from Eurostat. We note, for 
completeness, that Eurostat also reports government current expenditures on 
old-age and retirement income systems, but we used our own measures of the 
replacement value of the pension income. For the other countries, we list below 
the expenditure categories from the country’s statistical  abstract, which  we 
compared with the Eurostat categories. 
For Canada: Sickness included all government health expenditures. Invalid- 
ism was included  in the category of  sickness. Employment injury included 
provincial workers’ compensation. Maternity  was included  in  family assis- 
tance. Family assistance included all Canada assistance plans, family allow- 
ances, and other provincial welfare programs. Job training and placement in- 
cluded  Canada  job  strategies.  Unemployment  benefits  included  federal 
unemployment insurance. No expenditures were included under housing sub- 
sidies. And miscellaneous  social programs included  registered  Indians’ and 
veterans’ benefits, vocational rehabilitation of disabled persons, state tax cred- 
its and rebates, and municipal social security. 
For Japan: Sickness included all medical care expenditures paid directly by 
the government, the old-age insurance system, or the national insurance system 
(these expenditures include invalidism expenditures). Employment injury and 
disability expenditures included the benefit amounts paid for workers’ com- 
pensation  claims. Family assistance included net expenditure on social wel- 
fare. No expenditures were included under maternity. Job placement and train- 
ing  included  employment  services  expenditures.  Unemployment  benefits 
included total allowances paid under general employment insurance. Housing 
subsidies included housing aid. And no expenditures were included under mis- 
cellaneous. 76  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
For Sweden: Sickness included expenditures for sickness and disease. No 
expenditures were included under invalidism. Employment injury included oc- 
cupational industry insurance and industrial safety. No expenditures were in- 
cluded under maternity or job training and placement. Family assistance in- 
cluded  family  and  child  welfare  expenditures.  Unemployment  benefits 
included all unemployment insurance system expenditures. No expenditures 
were included under housing. And miscellaneous included veterans’ care. 
For Switzerland: Sickness included total public expenses on health care less 
administrative expenses. Invalidism included total expenses on invalid care 
less administrative expenses. Employment injury included all expenses, cost 
of treatment, daily indemnities, invalid premiums, and survival pay. No expen- 
ditures were included under maternity. Family assistance included  cantonal 
and federal aid to families. No expenditures were included under job training 
and placement. Unemployment included total expenses related to unemploy- 
ment. And no expenditures were included under housing subsidies or miscella- 
neous social programs. 
For the United States: Sickness included federal and state expenditures on 
Medicare, hospital, medical care, other health and medical programs, and vet- 
erans’ health and medical programs. Invalidism was included in sickness. Em- 
ployment  injury included state temporary disability insurance. All workers’ 
compensation, state and federal, and state temporary disability insurance. Ma- 
ternity assistance consisted of maternal and child health programs. Family as- 
sistance included public assistance, state and federal; Supplemental Security 
Income, state and federal; and food stamps. Job training and placement in- 
cluded other state and federal employment training programs and other public 
employment aid. Unemployment benefits included unemployment insurance; 
employment services, state and federal; and other railroad unemployment in- 
surance. Housing subsidies included housing expenditures, state and federal. 
And miscellaneous included all other public welfare programs. 
The importance of controlling for differences in publicly provided benefits 
may not be obvious for a study of executive and managerial compensation. To 
illustrate the importance of these differences, we selected health care costs, a 
benefit that is quite significant in U.S. compensation systems, to illustrate the 
international contrasts. Table 2.1 shows medical and health care expenditures 
for all OECD countries (the twelve we study and the remaining twelve, for 
which we have insufficient executive compensation data to use in our other 
statistical analyses). The table illustrates that,  when  valued at international 
prices, U.S. expenditures are higher per capita (col. A) but a lower percentage 
of GDP (col. C for 1990 and col. D for 1985) than the OECD average. On the 
other hand, U.S.  health care prices are 24 percent above the international aver- 
age (col. B). Of  our sample countries, the French spend the most per capita 
(in real terms), and the Japanese have the lowest health care prices. For com- 
parison purposes,  we include a column (col. E) showing the percentage of 
health purchases  made  in the private as opposed to the public sector. Our 77  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
Table 2.1  Medical and Health Care Expenditures in the OECD 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (El 
1990  1990  1990  1985  1990 
Real Health  Health  Health  Health  Private 
Care Expenditures  Price  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Country  per capita  Index  of GDP  of GDP  of Health 

























































































































































Sources: Purchasing power parities and real expenditures for 1990  are from Volume 1 EKS Results 1990 
(OECD 1992d) Tables 1.1, 1.3 and 1.6.  Purchasing power parities and real expenditures for 1985  are from 
OECD (1987b, table 3). 
Nore: 1990 real health care expenditures per capita (col. A) are stated in U.S. dollars using the OECD 
purchasing power parity price indices. The health price index (col. B) is relative to the OECD, which has 
a value of  100. 1990 and 1985 health percentages  (cols. C and D) are stated at OECD average prices. 
Columns A-D  include private and public expenditures. 
method of controlling for the public and private benefit packages has the effect 
of  counting as an employment cost the employer’s expenditures on health care 
and the taxes (regardless of  statutory incidence) that support the financing of 
both the private and the public components of the health care expenditures in 
a given country. Similarly, our method of computing the private replacement 
value of health care benefits counts the employer’s direct expenditures, govern- 
ment reimbursements of private expenditures, and direct public expenditures. 
Finally, the use of the OECD purchasing power parity exchange rates controls 78  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
for the enormous differences in local relative prices. Although not as detailed 
as the health care cost analysis shown here, our benefit valuation method pro- 
vides essentially the same comprehensive measurement of sources and prices 
for unemployment insurance, pensions, and other social welfare benefits as the 
table 2.1 comparison provides for health costs. 
Figure 2.4 shows the CEO’s private and public compensation package in 
OECD dollars at average annual OECD purchasing power parity rates. The 
figure has three components for each year and country entry. The component 
labeled private net compensation is base salary, annual bonus, voluntary bene- 
fits, perquisites, and long-term monetary compensation less employee payroll 
and income taxes; hence, this component is, essentially, after-tax total private 
compensation. The component labeled public bene3ts is the per capita expen- 
diture on all public benefits except pensions times four, plus the annuity equiv- 
alent of the projected public pension. The component labeled all payroll and 
income taxes equals payroll taxes (employer and CEO parts) plus the CEO’s 
personal income taxes. 
In the figure, the portion of each bar above zero shows the CEO’s replace- 
ment value of  public and private compensation and benefits in constant pur- 
chasing power (at OECD average prices). The two components of the positive 
part of each bar show the division of the replacement value between private 
after-tax compensation and public benefits. It is important to notice that, for 
countries like France, Italy, and Sweden, the public portion of the benefit pack- 
age is a significant part of the CEO’s compensation, as reflected in our measure 
of the replacement value. The portion of each bar below zero shows the amount 
of all payroll and income taxes. While the size of public benefits differs across 
countries, differences in payroll and income taxes, both in absolute size and in 
proportion to private net compensation, dwarf this variation. Heavier propor- 
tional tax burdens are weakly linked to larger public benefits, even for the 
CEO. The replacement value of public and private compensation and benefits 
for U.S. CEOs increased in real terms more than that of non-American CEOs. 
The high and increasing real standard of living of the American CEOs is due 
to higher before-tax compensation, lower effective taxes, and lower prices for 
goods and services. 
Figure 2.5 shows the top human resource director’s private and public com- 
pensation package. U.S. HRDs rank first in the replacement value of compen- 
sation in both 1984 and 1992. However, the differences between the HRDs are 
small, especially in comparison to the differences among the CEOs. Although 
U.S. HRDs rank tenth in compensation costs to their employers in 1992, they 
rank first in replacement value, by a slim margin, because of low taxes and low 
relative prices in the United States. 
Figure 2.6 shows a manufacturing employee’s private and public compensa- 
tion package for our twelve countries. U.S. manufacturing operatives are near 
the middle of the pack in the replacement value of their compensation. While 
low prices in the United States raised the ranking of U.S. manufacturing opera- 0  Private net compensation 
All payroll and income taxes 
m  Public benefits 
-300  84  aa 92  88 92 84  88 92  a4  88  92 84  88 92  88 92 84  88 92  84  aa 92 84  ea  92  84  tx 92 84  88 92 84  88  92 
Be1  Can  Fra  Ger  Ita  Jpn  Ntl  Spa  Swe  Swi  UK  US 
Fig. 2.4  Total taxes, private after-tax compensation, and public benefits for 
CEOs, 1984-92 
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Fig. 2.6  Total taxes, private after-tax compensation,  and public benefits for 
manufacturing operatives, 1984-92 
tives from tenth in terms of total compensation cost in  1992 to sixth in terms 
of replacement value, the lighter tax burdens seen in the case of U.S. CEOs 
and HRDs are not evident for U.S. manufacturing operatives. Considering all 
countries together, the manufacturing operatives have not made the gains in 
replacement value seen among the HRDs and CEOs during the sample period. 
2.3  Statistical Analysis of Total Compensation Cost and 
Replacement Value 
In this section, we conduct a variety of  statistical analyses using all our exec- 
utive compensation data to show the basic trends in compensation of  CEOs, 
high-level managers, and manufacturing operatives. We extracted the basic ex- 
ecutive compensation data from surveys conducted by Arthur Young, the Hay 
Group, Towers Perrin, and the Wyatt Company. Survey data apply to the years 
1984 and  1988-92.  A  source had to include information for at least three- 
fourths of our countries in order to enter the sample. The complete list of com- 
pensation sources is given in the data appendix. 
Table 2.2 presents a basic regression analysis of the levels of  three different 
compensation measures and  two different methods of  standardizing  across 
countries. For compensation measures, we considered (a)  total compensation, 
defined as the sum of base salary, annual monetary bonus, voluntary benefits, 
compulsory benefits (employer payroll taxes), perquisites, and long-term mon- Table 2.2  Regression Analysis of the Logarithms of Several Real Compensation Measures 
Log of Real Measure ($U.S.)  Log of PPP Measure (OECD) 
Compensation Measure 
and Independent Variable 
A. Total compensation 
Overall trend 
U.S. incremental effect 
U.S.  incremental trend 
Marginal employee income tax rate + 
marginal payroll rate 
Marginal corporate income tax rate 
R2 
Standard error of equation 
Error degrees of freedom 
B. Replacement value 
Overall trend 
US.  incremental effect 
U.S. incremental trend 
Marginal employee income tax rate + 
marginal payroll rate 
High-Level  Manufacturing 
CEO  Manager  Operative 
,125  ,011  ,085 
(.011)  (.047)  (.012) 
.816  .383  .482 
(.139)  (.219)  (.196) 
-.048  -  .052  -  .087 
(.023)  (.032)  (.034) 
-  ,339  ,244  -.234 
(.096)  (.169)  (.189) 
,160  ,464  ,391 
(.204)  (.316)  (.360) 
.853  ,706  ,598 
,150  ,208  ,550 
73  57  42 
,116  .025  ,089 
(.025)  (.043)  (.016) 
,891  .443  ,272 
(.180)  (.202)  (.267) 
-.055  ~  ,063  -.071 
(.029)  (.030)  (.047) 
-.895  -.271  -  ,272 
(.145)  (.156)  (.258) 
High-Level 
Manager  CEO 
Manufacturing 
Operative 
,025  -  .084 
(.014)  (.055) 
,536  .016 
(.180)  (.257) 
,022  ,026 
(.029)  (.038) 
-.512  .069 
(.124)  (.198) 
-  ,040  ,518 
(.263)  (.370) 
,675  .215 
,193  ,243 
73  57 
-  ,025  ~  ,070 
(.028)  (.046) 
,601  .075 
(.198)  (.216) 
,016  ,015 
(.031)  (.032) 
-  1.077  -  ,445 
(.159)  (.167) 





















(continued) Table 2.2  (continued) 
Log of Real Measure ($US.)  Log of PPP Measure (OECD) 
Compensation Measure  High-Level 
and Independent Variable  CEO  Manager 
Marginal corporate income tax rate  .I93  ,398 
R2  ,873  .735 
Standard error of  equation  .186  .I92 
Error degrees of freedom  49  57 
(.296)  (.292) 
C. Base + bonus or salary 
Overall trend 
U.S. incremental effect 
U.S. incremental trend 
Marginal employee income tax rate + 
marginal payroll rate 
Marginal corporate income tax rate 
R2 
Standard error of equation 






































-  .094 
(.032) 
-  ,772 
(.176) 
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Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients (with standard errors) from ordinary least squares regressions. Regressions for the CEO include variables indicating 
the data source and the average size of a company. Regressions for the high-level manager include the average size of a company in the survey. Panel C contains 
regressions analyzing the base plus bonus for the CEO and high-level manager and analyzing cash compensation for the manufacturing operative. The variable labeled 
marginalpayroll tax is the employee plus the employer marginal payroll tax rate. 83  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
etary compensation, as discussed in section 2.1; (b)  replacement value, defined 
as the sum of base salary, annual monetary bonus, voluntary benefits, perqui- 
sites, and public benefits (family of four) less employee payroll taxes and per- 
sonal income taxes (family of four), as discussed in section 2.2; and (c) base 
salary plus annual monetary bonus, a conventional measure. To standardize for 
price  differences we  used  (1) real  U.S.  dollars  (ie., compensation stated 
in local currency divided by  the product of the average annual exchange rate 
[local currency per dollar] and the US. consumer price index [1990 = l.OO]) 
and (2) OECD purchasing power parity dollars (i.e., compensation stated in 
local currency divided by  the product of the OECD purchasing power parity 
rate [local currency per dollar, 1990 based] and the OECD index of consumer 
prices [1990 = 1.00]).8 
Panel A of  table 2.2 shows our statistical analysis of total Compensation. 
Real total compensation of CEOs grew rapidly over the eight-year period from 
1984 to 1992 (a logarithmic trend of .125 with a standard error of  .011).  U.S. 
CEOs were paid more (incremental logarithmic effect of .816 with a standard 
error of .139),  but the U.S. trend was lower than in the other countries (incre- 
mental logarithmic trend of  -.048  with a standard error of .023).  We defer the 
discussion of tax rate effects until the next section. High-level managers’ real 
total conipensation did not grow (an overall trend of .011 with a standard error 
of  .047).  For the high-level managers, the U.S. total compensation is insignifi- 
cantly different from the average, and the incremental trend is negative, mean- 
ing that U.S. managers’ total compensation grew more slowly than the average 
of the twelve countries. For manufacturing operatives, real total compensation 
grew rapidly, but not as fast as for CEOs, over our sample period (overall trend 
of  .085 with  a standard error of  .012). U.S. manufacturing operatives had 
higher real total compensation (U.S. incremental effect of .482 with a standard 
error of  .196);  however, the U.S. trend for manufacturing operatives was nega- 
tive and fully offset the overall trend (a US.  incremental logarithmic trend of 
-.087  with a standard error of .034). The table also shows these analyses in 
terms of  local purchasing power. Using the OECD purchasing power parity 
rates, the relative position of U.S. CEOs, high-level managers, and manufactur- 
ing operatives is unchanged; however, there are no significant trends, either 
overall or incrementally for the United States, when the purchasing power par- 
ity adjusted measure of total compensation cost is used. 
Panel B of table 2.2 shows our statistical analysis of the replacement value 
of compensation (for the definition, see sec. 2.2).  Consider first the purchasing 
power parity results shown in the rightmost three columns of the table. These 
results use the OECD deflator that we also used to calculate the replacement 
values shown in section 2.2. There was no significant overall trend in the re- 
placement value of compensation for any of the three positions during the sam- 
8. The dollar was  chosen as the  unit of account for this analysis, but the  OECD purchasing 
power panty rates have the property that they are invariant with respect to the unit of  account. 84  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
ple period. U.S. CEOs, however, had a higher replacement  value than their 
non-American counterparts (a U.S. incremental effect of  .601 with a standard 
error of  .198). Neither high-level managers nor manufacturing operatives in 
the United  States had higher replacement values than elsewhere. The U.S. 
trend was not different from the overall trend for any of the three positions. 
The table also shows the  regression analysis of the replacement  value of 
compensation as measured  in  real (1990) U.S.  dollars in the leftmost three 
columns of panel B. Stated in terms of U.S. dollars, the CEOs and manufactur- 
ing operatives both had positive upward trends (overall trends of.  116 and .089 
with standard errors of .025 and .016, respectively). In addition, measured in 
1990 U.S. dollars, both U.S. CEOs and high-level managers had higher re- 
placement values (US. incremental effects of 391  and ,443 with standard er- 
rors of .180 and .202, respectively). On the other hand, measured in U.S. dol- 
lars, the U.S. replacement values were declining relative to the other eleven 
countries for all three positions (see the negative U.S. incremental trend coef- 
ficients). One should take caution in drawing conclusions from the replacement 
value comparisons when stated in 1990 U.S. dollars. Because we used the aver- 
age annual exchange rate and the U.S. consumer price index in this calculation, 
comparisons of these replacement values presume that the individual employ- 
ees could purchase private and public goods and services at U.S. prices, which 
is clearly not the case. For comparisons of replacement values, we prefer the 
results based on the OECD purchasing power parity rates. 
Panel C of table 2.2 presents the regression analysis of base salary plus an- 
nual monetary  bonus (cash compensation for the manufacturing  operative). 
This is a commonly used, although flawed, measure of pay. In terms of  1990 
U.S. dollars (the leftmost three columns of panel C), we note that the overall 
trend was positive for CEOs and manufacturing operatives but not for high- 
level managers. The United States had higher base plus bonus for the same 
two positions. The U.S. incremental trend, however, was negative, canceling 
about half the gain for CEOs and all the gain for manufacturing operatives. In 
terms of OECD purchasing power (the rightmost three columns), CEOs had a 
slightly positive upward trend, while the overall trend for the other two posi- 
tions was not significantly different from zero. U.S. CEOs and manufacturing 
operatives had higher base plus bonus than their non-American counterparts. 
Finally, in terms of purchasing power, the U.S. incremental trend was not sig- 
nificantly different from zero for any of the positions. 
We next consider two hypotheses concerning the integration of the product, 
capital, and labor markets among our twelve countries. Product and capital 
market integration alone is sufficient, under very general conditions, to equal- 
ize the employer cost of  labor. That is, increased product or capital market 
integration should be associated with smaller intercountry differences in the 
real total compensation costs. By  contrast, integration of  the labor markets, 
including the possibility of intercountry mobility, is required to reduce the dif- 
ferences across countries in the constant purchasing power replacement value 85  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
of the compensation package. Table 2.3 addresses these questions directly. We 
compute the adjusted intercountry variance of  real total compensation and re- 
placement value at purchasing power parity for each of  our sample yearsg  For 
all  three  positions  (CEOs, high-level  managers,  and  manufacturing  opera- 
tives), the variance of  real total compensation declined substantially over the 
sample period. Since the period from  1984 to  1992 represented  one of  in- 
creased goods flows between these countries and substantial real exchange rate 
adjustments, we believe that the decline in the variance of real total compensa- 
tion costs represents some evidence that the prices of these three types of labor 
are more similar now than at the beginning of the 1980s, as predicted by factor 
price equalization. Conversely, there is no downward movement in the vari- 
ances of  replacement value at purchasing power parity over the same time pe- 
riod. Since the labor markets of  these countries have not become more inte- 
grated  over this  time period  (with  the possible  exception of  the European 
Community countries), it is not surprising that we find no evidence of the vari- 
ance reductions that labor mobility might have induced. 
Many of the discussions of U.S.  CEO pay have focused on the ratio of CEO 
base plus bonus to manufacturing annual earnings (see, e.g., Crystal  1991). 
We believe that our two compensation measures (total compensation cost and 
replacement  value) provide a more complete picture of  the relative position 
of  CEOs and high-level managers as compared to manufacturing production 
employees. Figure 2.7 shows the following ratios: CEO total compensation to 
manufacturing total compensation, CEO replacement value of compensation 
to manufacturing replacement value, HRD total compensation to manufactur- 
ing total compensation, and, finally, HRD replacement value to manufacturing 
replacement  value. Whether measured  from the employer or employee per- 
spective, the ratio of American CEO compensation to that of manufacturing 
operatives is clearly much larger than the ratios in the other eleven countries. 
For HRDs, however, the American ratios are about average as compared to the 
ratios in the other eleven countries. 
Table 2.4 contains a statistical analysis of these pay ratios. Panel A of table 
2.4 analyzes the ratios for total compensation. For CEOs, the overall trend in 
the ratio of their total compensation to that of manufacturing operatives is posi- 
tive (a logarithmic trend of .034 with a standard error of .013), while the overall 
trend for high-level managers is insignificantly different from zero. For both 
CEOs and high-level managers, neither the U.S.  incremental effect nor the U.S. 
incremental trend is statistically significant. We discuss marginal tax rate ef- 
fects in the next section. Panel B  shows the analysis of  replacement  values 
relative to manufacturing employees. None of the overall trends is statistically 
9. The regression equation, whose residuals were used to compute these variances, included a 
complete set of  year indicators (for all positions), indicators for the source of the data (CEOs 
only), and indicators for the position (high-level managers only). A separate equation was fit for 
each position. 86  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
Table 2.3  Trends in the Intercountry Variance of Total Compensation  and 
Replacement Value, 1984-92 
1984  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Real total compensation: 
CEO  ,0863  ,0834  ,0614  ,0517  ,0436  .0378 
High-level manager  ,0486  ,0263  .0256 
Manufacturing employee  ,0774  .0375  ,0332  ,0315  .0241  ,0252 
CEO  ,1068  ,1970  ,1239  .1319 
High-level manager  .0204  .0434  ,0353 
Manufacturing employee  ,0415  ,0532  .0351  ,0328 
Replacement value at PPP: 
Note: Reported variance is the average squared residual by  year from a regression including a 
complete set of  year indicators (all rows), indicator variables for the source (CEOs only), and 
indicator variables for the position (high-level managers only). 
different from zero. U.S. CEOs, however, had a higher ratio than their counter- 
parts elsewhere (a U.S.  incremental  effect of  .681 with  a standard error of 
.351). The U.S. incremental trend is not statistically different from zero. 
To complement our analysis of the compensation levels and ratios, we con- 
sider in table 2.5 some differences in the structure of the CEO and HRD com- 
pensation for ten of  our twelve countries.I0 Consider first the effects of com- 
pany  size.  We  adjusted  our  own  statistical  analyses,  discussed  above,  for 
differences in the average size of the company responding to the source survey. 
However, we note that U.S. base salaries are more sensitive to company size 
than are the base salaries in other countries, as shown in the first two columns 
of table 2.5.l' One source of the larger U.S. salaries that appear in unadjusted 
comparisons is clearly the differential size effect in the United States compared 
to other countries. Another potential difference between U.S. and other execu- 
tive compensation systems is the use of stock-based long-term compensation. 
We consider this in more detail in the next section. We note that, according to 
Wyatt surveys, stock options, the most common long-term compensation plan 
in the United States, appear common in Europe. Incidence rates for stock op- 
tions are shown in the fourth column of table 2.5. There is a problem, however, 
with using these estimates of  the stock option incidence rates. The source for 
table 2.5 (the Wyatt Company) pools  salary responses for U.S. expatriates, 
other expatriates, and home country nationals in its executive compensation 
survey.I2 Therefore, the stock option incidence rates in the fourth column are 
10. The data in table 2.5 come exclusively from Wyatt sources, which did not contain compara- 
ble data for Canadian and Japanese firms. 
11. We believe that this statement is also true for total compensation, but we do not have the 
data with which to confirm this suspicion. 
12.  Arthur Young, the principal source for 1984, also includes expatriates in its survey. Towers 
Pemn, the principal source for 1988-90  and one of several sources for 1991 and 1992, includes 
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Table 2.4  Regression Analysis of the Ratio of Compensation of Managers to 
Manufacturing Operatives 
Log of Compensation 
Ratio 
Compensation Measure and  High-Level 
Independent Variable  CEO  Manager 
A. Total compensation relative 
to manufacturing operative 
Overall trend 
U.S. incremental effect 
U.S. incremental trend 




Standard error of equation 
Error degrees of freedom 
B. Replacement value relative 
to manufacturing operative 
Overall trend 
U.S. incremental effect 
U.S. incremental trend 




Standard error of equation 

























-  ,235 
(.268) 
,036 
















Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients (with standard errors) from ordinary least squares 
regressions. Regressions for the CEO include indicators for the data source. Data are for the years 
1984, 1988, and 1992 only. The marginal employee tax rate is the marginal personal income tax 
rate plus the sum of the marginal employee and employer payroll tax rates. 
contaminated by the relatively high representation of U.S. expatriates in the 
sample (shown in the fifth column). One solution to this problem is to estimate 
the stock option incidence rate for each country assuming that the home coun- 
try nationals have a zero incidence rate and that the U.S. expatriates have the 
rate shown in the U.S. row of the table. The final column of the table makes 
this calculation. In every country except for the United Kingdom, the estimated 
stock option incidence rate in the final column is lower than the actual survey 89  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
Table 2.5  Some Characteristics  of the Wyatt Executive Compensation Sample 
CEOs 
CEO  HRD  Company  %CEOs  %  Options 
Sales  Sales  Sales  Awarded  American  if National 
Country  Elasticity  Elasticity  ($US.)  Options  Expatriates  Rate = 0 (%) 




































































Source; Wyatt Co. (1992b). 
Nore: Sales elasticity is from the regression of log base salary on log sales. Comparable data for 
Canada and Japan were not available. 
rate (fourth column), indicating that either U.S. expatriates receive stock op- 
tions more often than their U.S. counterparts  (which is unlikely) or that the 
foreign national stock option incidence rate is above 2er0.l~  This conclusion is 
particularly important for countries like Germany and Sweden where popular 
discussions of the compensation packages assert that the long-term component 
of compensation is zero.I4 
2.4  Tax and Institutional Differences between Countries 
In the descriptive analyses of  sections 2.2 and 2.3, we noted (1) that differ- 
ences in long-term compensation are very important between the United States 
and the other countries in our study and (2) that marginal tax rates appear to 
be related to all our measures of  compensation.  In this  section, we explore 
these issues in greater detail. With respect to tax effects, we show (1) that top 
personal marginal income tax rates have become lower and more equal over 
our sample period, (2) that top marginal payroll tax rates (employer plus em- 
ployee parts) have remained very unequal, with no change in the level for exec- 
utives, (3) that marginal income tax and payroll tax rates for manufacturing 
13. Charterhouse (1989, 1991) estimates show that U.K. CEOs receive stock options at a rate 
exceeding the Wyatt estimate and that this rate grew over the 1980s. 
14. Our own figs. 2.1 and 2.2 above show no long-term compensation for Belgian, German, 
Japanese, Dutch, and Swedish executives. The value of the long-term component of compensation 
in these countries was estimated from Towers Pemn sources. Towers Pemn excludes all expatri- 
ates from its Worldwide Remunerurion surveys. Thus, for the Wyatt and Towers Penin estimates 
of  long-term compensation incidence rates to be consistent for Germany and Sweden, it must be 
the case that other European expatriates account for the positive stock option incidence rates in 
these countries. 90  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
employees have increased and become more unequal, and, finally, (4) that mar- 
ginal overall tax rate differences are strongly related both to the levels of total 
pay and to the ratios of executive/managerial pay to the pay of manufacturing 
operatives. With respect to the differences in long-term compensation, we ex- 
amine both the tax-favored and the non-tax-favored forms of stock-based com- 
pensation in all twelve of  our countries. Although many countries limit or re- 
fuse favorable tax treatment of  stock options, they are, nevertheless, legal in 
all twelve of our countries. Consequently, it is difficult to explain why execu- 
tives in other countries receive far less of this kind of compensation, especially 
since the disclosure requirements in other countries are generally not as restric- 
tive as those in the United States. 
Define the marginal tax rate on personal income as the tax due from a one- 
unit increase in taxable personal income. Define the marginal tax rate on cor- 
porate income as the tax due from a one-unit increase in taxable corporate 
income. Let the marginal employer payroll tax rate be the payroll tax due from 
the employer from a one-unit increase in base salary. Finally, define the mar- 
ginal employee payroll tax rate as the payroll tax due from the employee from 
a one-unit increase in base  ~a1ary.I~  Table 2.6 shows our estimates of these 
marginal tax rates based on the sources discussed in the data appendix for 1984 
and  1992. The columns labeled both payroll taxes show the sum of  the em- 
ployer and employee marginal payroll tax. For the executive employees, mar- 
ginal personal income tax rates declined in every country in the sample (as did 
top corporate rates, also shown, for most countries). At the same time, marginal 
personal income tax rates for the manufacturing employees do not show a clear 
trend between the two years. As regards marginal payroll tax rates, the sum of 
the employer and employee top marginal rates was virtually unchanged for the 
executives but rose substantially for the manufacturing employees. 
Variability in the marginal personal income tax rates and in the marginal 
payroll tax rates  (sum of  employer and employee parts)  is not matched by 
equivalent variability in the level of public benefits provided to executives as 
opposed  to manufacturing  employees. The distortion  induced  in  the  wage 
structure of our sample countries from the heterogeneous marginal tax rates 
coupled with the heterogeneous benefit schedules is evident in the regression 
analyses shown in tables 2.2 and 2.4 above. In table 2.2, we note that the mar- 
ginal employee income tax rate plus the marginal payroll rate (sum of employer 
15. For clarity, we note that payroll tux is an American business term. In international English, 
these are often called mandatory employer and employee contributions, which depend on compen- 
sation (salary, annual bonus, other cash payments, the taxable part of  voluntary benefit packages, 
the taxable part of perquisites) and not directly on family or personal revenue subject to income 
tax. A payroll tax is a deductible business expense for the employer and, generally but not always, 
deductible for the employee. The French terms are cotisations patronales (employer) and salari- 
ales (employee). The German terms are Gesetzliche Arbeifgeberbeitruge (employer) and Arbeit- 
nehmer (employee). The Italian terms are contributi obbligatori a carico dell 'azienda (employer) 
and dipendente  (employee). The Japanese terms are kaisha no hdteikyo shukkin  (employer) and 
jGgydin no hateikyo shukkin (employee). 91  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
Table 2.6  Summary of Marginal Tax Rates for Corporate Income Tax, 
Personal Income Tax, and Payroll Taxes in 1984 and 1992 





























Executive  Manufacturing 
Employee  Employee 
Corporate  Personal  Both  Personal  Both  between 
Difference 
Income  Income  Payroll  Income  Payroll  Executive and 
Tax  Taxes  Tax  Taxes  Manufacturing 
- 
.45  .72 
.46  .52 
.50  .65 
.63  .56 
.46  .7  1 
.56  .78 
.48  .72 
.35  .66 
.52  .70 
.3  1  .46 
.52  .60 
.55  .62 
.48  .64 
.39  .59 
.44  .49 
.37  .57 
.59  .53 
.48  .5  1 
.52  .65 
.35  .60 
.35  .53 
.30  .49 
.3  1  .50 
.35  .40 
.40  .42 





















































.35  .52 
.I3  .25 
.45  .26 
.40  -  .03 
.38  .22 
.22  .37 
.58  -  .02 
.35  .12 
.30  .62 
.21  .14 
.25  .05 
.27  .19 
.32  .22 
.61  .06 
.I9  .04 
.68  .03 
.57  -  .23 
.72  -  .39 
.35  .12 
.57  -  .23 
.46  -.16 
.5 1  .o  1 
.3 1  .24 
.29  -  .04 
.35  -.11 
.47  -  .05 
Source Note: Corporate marginal income tax rates are for undistributed income as reported by 
Price Waterhouse (1984, 1992). Marginal tax rates for executives are for the CEO in the Arthur 
Young  (1985) survey using the tax  schedules in Price Waterhouse (1984) and the CEO in the 
Towers Penin (1992) survey using tax schedules therein. Marginal tax rates for manufacturing 
employees are for the BLS manufacturing employee using tax schedules in Price Waterhouse 
(1984) Wyatt (1992a), and Price Waterhouse (1992). The column labeled difference bemeen exec- 
utive and manufacturing is the difference between the sum of the two executive marginal tax rates 
shown and the two manufacturing rates shown. 
and employee parts) is strongly negatively related to CEO compensation re- 
gardless of the measure chosen. For the other high-level executives, there is 
some evidence of a negative relation between marginal employee tax rates and 
compensation (primarily for  the  replacement value  measures), but  not  as 
strong as for the CEO. Conversely, the marginal employee tax rate (including 
both parts of the payroll taxes) has a significant negative effect on manufactur- 92  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
ing compensation only when we use base salary plus annual monetary bonus 
as the compensation measure. These results suggest that the public financing 
and supply of benefits  serves to depress the compensation  of CEOs and, to 
a lesser extent, high-level  executives but serves only to change the form of 
manufacturing compensation from private to public benefits. 
Table 2.4 confirms this conclusion by showing that the ratio of  both CEO 
and high-level manager compensation (either total compensation or replace- 
ment value) to manufacturing operative compensation exhibits a strong nega- 
tive relation to the difference between the marginal employee tax rates (per- 
sonal income  tax rate plus  the  sum of  employer  and  employee payroll  tax 
rates). The final column of table 2.6 shows that this difference in marginal tax 
rates declined markedly over our sample period. Consequently, although there 
is no overall trend toward higher ratios of executive to manufacturing compen- 
sation, the strong negative trend in differential marginal tax rates was associ- 
ated with a pronounced increase in these ratios; that is, the trend toward greater 
executive to manufacturing operative pay is entirely "explained"  by the down- 
ward trend in differential marginal tax rates. As it becomes legally possible to 
deliver higher executive standards of living through the compensation system, 
it appears that executive pay increases relative to manufacturing pay regardless 
of the cultural environment. 
Turning now from tax effects on total compensation and replacement value 
to tax effects on long-term compensation, we try to explain why stock-based 
compensation is less common in all our sample countries as compared to the 
United States. Unfortunately, the answer is not as apparent as in the case of the 
effects of changes in the tax structures on total compensation measures. Table 
2.7  shows  the  legal  status of  tax-favored  and non-tax-favored,  stock-based 
long-term compensation plans in all our countries."j Such compensation is le- 
gal in all twelve countries. In addition, most of  the countries have some form 
of tax-favored scheme, although these schemes are often limited with respect 
to the size of the tax benefit. Furthermore, plans resembling U.S. nonqualified 
stock option plans, which were not designed to be tax favored but which do 
have a tax advantage whenever individual marginal tax rates (the sum of the 
marginal personal income tax rate, the employer marginal payroll tax rate, and 
the employee marginal payroll tax rate) exceed corporate marginal income tax 
rates or whenever individual marginal tax rates are likely to fall in the future, 
would be  similarly tax advantaged  in  every  country  we  studied except the 
Netherlands and Sweden. Table 2.6 shows that both the conditions for a tax 
16. A compensation plan is tax favored if it results in lower total tax payments, i.e., if the present 
value of corporate income taxes plus personal income taxes plus all payroll taxes is lower than 
would result from an equivalent amount of total compensation delivered using salary instead of 
long-term compensation. The tax-favored status of the plans shown in table 2.7 depends on the 
deductibility of the compensation expense from taxable corporate income. For all countries shown 
in the table (except the United States), the expense associated with the stock-based compensation 
is a legal employment expense and would, thus, be  deductible; however, the tax guides do not 
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Table 2.7  Summary of Employee Tax Weatment of Long-Term, Stock-Based 
Compensation Plans 
Ordinary Long-Term 
Compensation and Recent Legal  Tax-Favored Long-Term 
Country  Compensation and Restrictions  Changes 
Canada 
France 
Belgium  SOs: G is TE when XN per year 
does not exceed the lesser of 
BEF 500,000 or 25% of EE's 
normal salary. X 2 S(0).  H 2 2. 
SOs: 25% of G is TE when X 2 
S(O),  remainder taxed as EI. 
SOs: G is TE when H 2  1 and 




Netherlands  SOs: 7.5% of S(0)N taxable as 
EI in year of grant. G is TE if X 
2 S(0) and R 5  5.  If  SO is not 
exercised, there is no refund of 




SOs: G taxed as CG, which is 
adjusted for holding period and 
inflation before the EI rates are 
applied, if EE was charged for 
the option. 
Convertible debenture: Fair 
market value of the convertible 
debenture is S(0)N. If EE buys 
debenture for S(O)N, then 60% 
of the gain at the exercise of the 
conversion provision, [S(1) - 
S(O)]N, is TE. If EE pays less 
than fair market value, say, PN, 
then [S(O) -  PIN is taxable 
immediately as EI, and 60% of 
Other SOs: G taxed as EL Passage 
of the 1984 Fiscal Recovery Act 
created tax favored SOs. 
Other SOs: G taxed as EI. 
1988-89  33% of G was TE, and 
50% of G was TE in 1987. 
Other SOs: G taxed as EI. 
Restrictions on foreign companies 
offering SOs to French residents 
were removed in 1986. 
SOs: G taxed as EI. However, if R 
5 9 months, G = [S(O) -  X]N. 
SOs: G taxed as El. Security 
regulations were relaxed in 1988. 
SOs: G taxed as El. Japanese 
firms are generally prohibited 
from acquiring their own stock. 
EE stock association groups must 
be set up to acquire stock in order 
to permit EEs to exercise their 
SOs. Although these associations 
are independent, they are funded 
by the company and EE 
contributions. 
Other SOs: same tax system 
applies; however, the percentage 
of S(0)N that will be taxed as EI 
in the grant year must be 
negotiated with Dutch tax 
authorities. 
Other SOs: G taxed as EI if the 
SO was granted at no charge to 
the EE, as is typical in an 
American compensation SO 
SOs are taxed as EI when granted. 
Taxable EI is the difference 
between the fair market value of 
the SO and the price paid by the 
EE at the grant, say ZN. At 
exercise no taxable income is 
recognized. When the stock is 
sold, the gain on sale [S(  I) - 
X]N -  ZN is taxable as CG. 
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Table 2.7  (continued) 
Ordinary Long-Term 
Compensation and Recent Legal  Tax-Favored Long-Term 
Country  Compensation and Restrictions  Changes 
[S(1) -  S(O)]N is TE. H 2  2. 
Other variations are possible. 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom  SOs: G and subsequent stock 
price appreciation taxed as CG 
when the shares are sold, not at 
exercise. 3 I  R I  10, minimum 
3-year interval between 
exercises, and the value of shares 
underlying the SOs must not 
exceed the larger of 4  times an 
EE’s earnings or €100,000. 
Incentive stock options (ISOs) 
are not taxed until the EE sells 
the shares. If R 2  2 and H 2 1, 
G plus the price appreciation on 
the stock since exercise is taxed 
as CG. Compensation expense of 
G is not tax deductible for the 
employer. 
United States 
price at sale of the stock and not 
at exercise in this case.) There are 
some restrictions on Swedish 
companies granting stock options 
that can be circumvented by the 
use of parent companies and 
independent stock option funds. 
Prior to 1989 exchange controls 
effectively prohibited stock option 
plans by nowSwedish companies. 
SOs: G taxed as EI. 
Other SOs: G is taxed as EI. If R 
< 7, taxable income may be 
recognized on the grant date. 
Legislation in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s promoted EE stock 
ownership. 
Other SOs: Nonqualified plans 
have G taxed as EI. ISOs are not 
automatically tax favored because 
of  the loss of the employer’s tax 
deduction on the compensation 
expense. 
~  ~  ~~  ~~  ~~ 
Sources:  Primarily William H.  Mercer  International and Arthur Anderson & Co. (1990).  with 
supplemental information from other tax sources listed in the data appendix. 
Nore: BEF = Belgian francs. S(0) = market price of share at grant. S(1) = market price of share 
at exercise. X = exercise price of option. N = number of shares optioned. G = [S( 1) -  XIN. H = 
number of years shares are held after the exercise of the options. R = number of years the options 
are held after the grant. SOs  = stock options. EE = employee. TE = exempt from employee 
income and payroll taxes. EI = employment income (called earned income  in the United States). 
CG = long-term capital gain. 
advantage from non-tax-favored stock option compensation held for all our 
sample countries except Germany over the period  1984-92. Thus, we might 
expect that German, Dutch, and Swedish CEOs would have less stock-based 
compensation for purely tax reasons. For the other countries, however, stock 
options should have  been at least as attractive a form of  compensation for 
CEOs as they were in the United States. We  cannot explain why among non- 
Americans only Canadian, French, Italian, Swiss, and British CEOs have any 95  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
stock-based  compensation.  We  also cannot explain  why  the  proportion  of 
stock-based long-term compensation is not higher in these countries, although 
we note that France and the United Kingdom have very strong positive trends 
for long-term compensation. 
2.5  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the total compensation of chief executive 
officers,  high-level  managers,  and  manufacturing  operatives  from  twelve 
OECD countries  over the period  1984-92.  American  CEOs are clearly  the 
highest paid whether we measure compensation from an employer cost view- 
point or from an individual replacement value viewpoint. American high-level 
managers, on the other hand, receive compensation that is on par with their 
counterparts in the other eleven countries. We identified three important factors 
related to the higher compensation of U.S.  executives. First, the U.S. tax sys- 
tem favored direct compensation as opposed to unmeasured perquisites rela- 
tive to the compensation systems of the other countries. The negative relation 
between marginal tax rates and total compensation (either measure) establishes 
this effect. As marginal tax rates of executives increase as compared to those 
of  ordinary  employees,  a  country’s  compensation structure  becomes  more 
compressed; that is, the ratio of executive compensation to manufacturing op- 
erative compensation declines.  An international trend toward lower top-end tax 
rates, therefore, contributed to an increase in executive pay relative to that of 
manufacturing operatives. The second factor contributing to the difference be- 
tween U.S. CEOs and others is the large component of long-term compensa- 
tion that they receive. CEOs in other countries are much less likely to receive 
stock-based compensation even when the same tax incentives exist to use such 
remuneration. Although we can document the differences in the institutional 
environments across our sample countries, we cannot explain why companies 
outside the United States do not use stock option compensation more exten- 
sively. The third factor affecting U.S. executive compensation relative to other 
countries is the relatively low price of goods and services in the United States 
as compared to the other OECD countries. Purchasing power adjusted compar- 
isons, particularly using the replacement value of the compensation package, 
thus, accentuate  U.S. differences,  whereas  exchange rate-adjusted  compari- 
sons, particularly  over the period  1984-92,  tend  to ameliorate  those differ- 
ences. 
Our compensation comparisons for the executives as well as for the manu- 
facturing production  employees are more extensive than  most other studies 
because we  considered  both total  compensation costs from the  employer’s 
viewpoint and the replacement value of the compensation package, both public 
and private components, from the employee’s viewpoint. Integration of interna- 
tional goods and capital markets provides  an  economic mechanism driving 
total compensation costs to equality across countries. Our evidence suggests 96  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
that the increased trade in goods and capital has come at the same time as 
lower intercountry variance in total compensation costs for all three positions 
studied. This result suggests that factor price equalization may have been an 
important factor driving changes in wage rates across countries. The integra- 
tion of world labor markets is required to drive the replacement value of the 
compensation package to equality across countries. We find no evidence that 
the  intercountry  variance  in  the  replacement  value  of  compensation  has 
changed over our sample period. 
While one could refine many of the measures used in this paper, we believe 
that our basic conclusions are sound regarding the relative compensation struc- 
tures  and  the correlates  of  differences across countries in  these  structures. 
American CEOs are paid more than their counterparts elsewhere. Whether that 
higher pay  is justified by  the economic performance of the firms that these 
Americans manage is still an open question. Regardless of  the answer to this 
question, it is clear that the American pay advantage is limited to CEOs. Ameri- 
can high-level managers and manufacturing production workers are compen- 
sated in a manner quite typical of the other developed countries we studied. 
Data Appendix 
Compensation  Data 
Sources for CEO Compensation data in 1984 and 1988-92 
Arthur Young (1985) includes base plus bonus, estimated personal income 
taxes, and estimated employee payroll taxes. Employer payroll taxes (compul- 
sory benefits), voluntary  benefits, perquisites, and  long-term  compensation 
were estimated using the sources listed below. Towers Perrin (1988) includes, 
for 1988, base plus bonus, compulsory benefits, perquisites, long-term com- 
pensation, estimated income taxes, and estimated employee payroll taxes. Vol- 
untary benefits were estimated for 1988 using the sources listed below. Data 
are for a company with $100 million in annual sales. Towers Perrin (1991) 
includes voluntary benefits. Data are for a company with $250 million in an- 
nual sales. Towers Perrin  (1989, 1990) include the same variables as  1988, 
while Towers Perrin (1992) is comparable to 199  1. Wyatt Company ( 199213) 
includes base plus bonus,  estimated individual income taxes, and estimated 
employee payroll taxes. To  facilitate comparisons with Towers Perrin, Wyatt 
base plus bonus estimates were adjusted to represent a company with $250 
million annual sales using Wyatt’s regression coefficients. Voluntary benefits, 
compulsory benefits, perquisites, and long-term compensation were estimated 
using Towers Perrin  (1992)  and the  sources  listed  below. Wyatt  Company 
(1992~)  includes only base plus bonus. All other Japanese compensation com- 97  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
ponents were estimated using Towers Pemn (1992) and the sources listed be- 
low. The 1992 Wyatt Japanese base plus bonus data are for a company with 
1,000-2,999 employees. 
Sources for HRD Compensation in 1984, 1991, and 1992 
Arthur Young  (1985), Towers Pemn  (1991, 1992), and Wyatt  Company 
(1992b, 1992~).  All variables are comparable to the CEO variables discussed 
above from the same source. 
Source for Cadre Dirigeant (highest management level) and Cadre Supirieur 
(senior management) in 1991 
Btnichou (1992) reports the results of  a specially commissioned study by 
the Hay  Group, giving base plus bonus, estimated individual income taxes, 
and estimated employee payroll taxes. Voluntary benefits, compulsory benefits, 
perquisites, and long-term compensation were estimated using Towers Pemn 
(1991) and the sources listed below. 
Sources for Manufacturing Employee Compensation in 1984 and 1988-92 
U.S. Department of Labor (1991) includes hourly total compensation costs 
for a manufacturing production worker from each of our countries in each of 
our analysis years. We  compare the BLS component “pay for time worked,” 
which includes all cash payments made to the workers before any deductions 
of any kind, to executive base plus bonus. Voluntary benefits are measured as 
the difference between the BLS “hourly direct pay,” which includes the com- 
pensation components normally classified as voluntary benefits, and “pay for 
time worked.” Compulsory benefits are measured as the BLS “employer social 
insurance expenditures,” which includes all legally mandated compensation 
components. We used OECD (1991a, 1992a) to estimate the BLS measures for 
1991 and 1992. OECD hourly rates in manufacturing were used to estimate 
1991 and 1992 hourly compensation costs by multiplying by the 1990 ratio of 
BLS hourly compensation costs to hourly pay for time worked. A comparable 
calculation was used to estimate the voluntary and compulsory benefits com- 
ponents. Annual  hours  were  taken  from  International Labor  Organization 
(1991). We  assumed that no additional perquisites and no long-term compen- 
sation were paid to the manufacturing employees. Note that pension costs are 
included by the BLS in the two benefit measures as appropriate. 
Personal Income Tax Rates 
Primary Sources for Personal Income Tax Rates for all Executives and 
Manufacturing Employees in 1984 
and OECD (1988). 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells (1989, U.S. Department of the Treasury (1984), 98  John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno 
Primary Sources for CEO Personal Income Tax Rates in 1988-90 
DRT International (1991), all countries; the OECD Economic Surveys, all 
countries, various years; and Price Waterhouse, Doing Business  in . . . , all 
countries, various years. 
Primary Sources for Personal Income Tax Rates for All Executives in 
199  1-92 
Towers Perrin (1991, 1992). 
Primary Sources for Personal Income Tax Rates for Manufacturing 
Employees in 1991 and 1992 
countries, various years. 
Wyatt  Company (1992a), Price Waterhouse, Doing  Business  in . . . , all 
Corporate Income-Tax Rates 
Primary Source for Corporate Income Tax Rates in 1984 
Price Waterhouse (1984). 
Primary Source for Corporate Income Tax Rates in 1988-92 
DRT International (1991), all issues; the OECD  Economic Surveys, all coun- 
tries, various years; and Price Waterhouse, Doing Business in . . . ,  all coun- 
tries, various years. 
Social Security and Other Payroll Taxes 
Social Security and Other Payroll Taxes for Manufacturing Employees 
U.S. Department of Labor (1990, 1991). 
Social Security and Other Payroll Taxes for All Executives 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells (1989, William M. Mercer International (1987, 
1992), Towers Perrin (1988), and Wyatt Company (1992a). Private communi- 
cation with INSEE Division of Revenue was used for French payroll taxes. 
Public Benefits Sources and Expenditure Categories 
European Community Countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) 
Eurostat (1989, 1990, 1991, 1992). 99  International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation 
Other Countries 
Statistics Canada  (1988,  1990, 1992), Japan Productivity Center  (1988, 
1990), Japan Institute of Labor (1991), Management and Coordination Agency 
(1991), Statistics Sweden (1992), Central Bureau  of  Statistics of  Norway 
(1992) (the Norwegian tables contained some comparative data with Sweden), 
Nordic Statistical Secretariat (1990), Office FCdCral de la Statistique (1989, 
1992), U.S. Chamber of  Commerce (1991), U.S. Department of  Commerce 
(1989, 1990, 1991), and International Monetary Fund (1991). 
Exchange Rates and Purchasing Power Parities and Consumer Prices 
Average annual exchange rates are from CITIBASE (1989). Where rates 
could  not  be  found  in  CITIBASE  (1989),  they  were  taken  from  U.S. 
Department of Labor (  199  1). 
For the basis on which the OECD computed purchasing power parities, see 
OECD (1992d). To compute 1990-based  purchasing power parities in the years 
1985,1990, and 1991, we used OECD (1992b). We used changes in consumer 
prices to put the other year purchasing power parities on the base year 1990 
and, thus, to  estimate the  1984, 1988,  1989, and  1992 purchasing power 
parities using OECD (1989a, 1992a). 
The U.S. consumer price index is from CITIBASE (1989). The OECD index 
of consumer prices is from OECD (1990a, 1992b). 
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Fig. 2A.2  Total compensation of HRDs at purchasing power parity exchange 
rates, 1984-92 
Fig. 2A.3  Total compensation of manufacturing operatives at purchasing 
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